conomic freedom enables large corporations to exert considerable influence over the nation. However, before exploring this influence, it might be useful to examine how large corporations emerged.
Efficiency Hypothesis
The efficiency explanation is associated with business historian Alfred Chandler (1977) who claims that the nineteenth-century organizational revolution originated from a desire for economic efficiency. This was made possible by advances in technology, new sources of energy, faster means of transportation and communication, and growing market size. New forms of production permitted economies of scale, which led to mass production. The source of these economies was speed, such as speed of throughput of materials in production. New and faster means of transportation and communication enabled mass distribution and mass marketing. An administrative hierarchy, staffed by professional managers rather than owners, supervised the new organization. Corporations that successfully implemented the new mass-production techniques and organizational methods enjoyed considerably lower costs.
2
Large corporations built their own marketing and distribution networks, thereby internalizing several phases of operations and replacing the invisible hand of the market with administrative coordination.
3 Internalization, according to Chandler, led to lower transaction costs, including lower information costs, a more intensive use of facilities and personnel, a steadier cash flow, and prompter payment. Mergers led to a consolidation of production, centralization of administration, and the establishment of marketing and purchasing organizations. Chandler insists that mergers undertaken for financial gain, or to control competition, were profitable only in the short run. Without efficiency gains, the merged firms were unlikely to survive. Chandler concludes that the corporate revolution was immensely successful and a contributing factor to American economic progress.
Oliver Williamson (1981) offers another efficiency explanation for the corporation based on organizational changes intended to economize on transaction costs. He does not believe that the desire for monopoly profits and technology can explain the choice between internal coordination and markets, although these factors played a role. In his opinion, most firms did not possess the structural characteristics, such as high concentration and barriers to entry, to engage in strategic behavior. According to Williamson, only transaction costs can explain satisfactorily the organizational innovations that led to the modern corporation. Transactions costs include the myriad costs involved in negotiations, the writing of contracts, the execution and monitoring of contracts, and the resolution of disagreements. Firms, as noted by Ronald Coase (1937), have to decide whether it is cheaper to avoid or minimize these costs by producing internally or else go with market transactions. This analysis, writes Williamson, is influenced by the presence
